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ABSTRACT
The hydrogen economy is not possible if the safety standards currently applied to liquid
hydrogen and hydrogen gas by many laboratories are applied to devices that use either liquid
or gaseous hydrogen.  Methane and propane are commonly used by ordinary people without
the special training.  This report asks, “How is hydrogen different from flammable gasses that
are commonly being used all over the world?”  This report compares the properties of
hydrogen, methane and propane and how these properties may relate to safety when they are
used in both the liquid and gaseous state.  Through such an analysis, sensible safety standards
for the large-scale (or even small-scale) use of liquid and gaseous hydrogen systems can be
developed.  This paper is meant to promote discussion of issues related to hydrogen safety so
that engineers designing equipment can factor sensible safety standards into their designs.
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INTRODUCTION
The safety regulations for hydrogen (both in the liquid and gaseous state) compared to
methane and propane were not always as burdensome as they are today at many of the
government laboratories.  Hydrogen was commonly used to light and heat houses during the
hundred years between 1850 and 1950.  Coal gas (or producer gas) was up to 50 percent
hydrogen.  The remaining components were carbon monoxide (30 to 40 percent) and other
gasses.  The flammability limits of coal gas are almost the same as for the hydrogen itself.
The most dangerous part of using coal gas was carbon monoxide poisoning.  As a result, a
small amount of an agent that causes the stink of gas had to be added to the gas.  Prior to
1937 hydrogen was used as a lifting agent for passenger carrying dirigibles.  Hydrogen gas
has been used as a cooling agent for very large generators since the 1930’s.
What changed the safety regulations and the perception of safety regulators (particularly
at the US physics laboratories)?  The event that changed the perception of the public was the
Hindenburg disaster at Lakehurst New Jersey in 1937.  The Hindenburg burned and crashed,
killing nearly half of the passengers who had flown from Berlin.  (Most of the passengers
who died fell or jumped from the Hindenburg.)  The disaster that affected the thinking about
liquid hydrogen in US laboratories was the explosion and fire that killed several people at the
Cambridge Electron Accelerator in Cambridge Massachusetts in the 1960s.
This paper will compare hydrogen with methane, and propane.  It is hoped that the paper
will separate some real dangers of hydrogen from the perceived dangers of hydrogen. This
paper is not intended to be the end all paper on hydrogen safety.  A comparison between
hydrogen safety standards and those applied to methane and propane leads to a number of
inconsistencies, particularly when one considers the fact that hydrogen may be less dangerous
than either methane or propane.
This paper will show that safety standards that are commonly applied to systems with
small amounts of liquid hydrogen or gaseous hydrogen may not make sense when applied to
larger quantities of liquid or gaseous hydrogen.  Safety committees often make blanket
pronouncements concerning hydrogen safety without thinking of the consequences.  In the
eyes of some safety committees, not allowing the use hydrogen is the only safe course of
action.   This is like saying that physics will be safe as long as no one does any experiments.
PROPERTIES OF HYDROGEN, METHANE, AND PROPANE
In TABLE 1, hydrogen is compared with methane and propane in terms of hazards that
may damage equipment or endanger people.   The list of hazards include 1) rapid expansion
from liquid to gas, 2) material failure due to temperature embrittlement, 3) freezing of body
parts due to temperature, 4) oxygen enrichment on the tank surface, 5) flammability or
chemical explosion, 6) chemical embrittlement due to exposure, 7) asphyxiation (oxygen
deprivation), and 8) the density of the gas relative to room temperature air.  The hazards
shown in TABLE 1 are directly related to the physical properties of the three gasses.  (The
author does not consider propane to be a cryogenic gas, because its 1 atm liquefaction
temperature is above that of air gasses.  In many ways propane behaves like a cryogenic gas.)
The chemical and cryogenic properties of the three gasses are presented in TABLE 2 and
TABLE 3.  TABLE 2 compares the chemical properties that relate to flammability for
hydrogen, methane, and propane [1].  The stoichiometric burning of the three gasses in air is
given as follows;
2H2 + O2 + 3.76N2 = 2H2O + 3.76N2
    CH4 + 2O2 + 7.52N2 = CO2 + 2H2O + 7.52N2 (1)
C3H8 + 5O2 + 18.8N2 = 3CO2 + 4H2O +18.8N2
Note: the equations above neglect argon, carbon dioxide, and the trace gasses that are present
in air.  These gasses have little effect on the chemical process.  The stoichiometric burning of
the gasses in oxygen can be represented by the equations above with the nitrogen taken out.
TABLE 3 presents the cryogenic properties of the hydrogen, methane and propane [2].
For comparison, the cryogenic properties of helium [3], nitrogen [2], and oxygen [2] are also
included in TABLE 3.  (Note: under the usual definition of a cryogenic fluid, propane isn’t
one.)  Helium and nitrogen were included because they are well understood cryogenic fluids
commonly used in physics experiments.  The properties of oxygen are given because it is the
oxidizing agent for all three of the flammable gases given in the table.  Liquid air has
properties that are between those of oxygen and nitrogen.
TABLE 1.  A list of safety hazards associated with liquid and gaseous hydrogen, methane and propane.
Potential Safety Hazard H2 CH4 C3H8
Large liquid to gas expansion ratio Yes Yes Yes
Cryogenic embrittlement of materials Yes Yes Sometimes
Freezing of body parts (human) Yes Yes Maybe
Flammability and chemical explosion Yes Yes Yes
Chemical embrittlement of materials Yes No No
Oxygen enrichment due to temperature Yes No No
Asphyxiation (oxygen deprivation) Yes Yes Yes
Is the gas heavier than 300 K air? No Sometimes Always
TABLE 2.  The combustion characteristics of hydrogen, methane, and propane in air and pure oxygen.
Parameter H2 CH4 C3H8
Flammability limits in air (%) 4.0 - 74.2 5.0 – 15.0 2.1 – 9.4
Ignition temperature in air (K) ~855 ~925 ~770
Ignition energy @ STP (J/cc) ~0.74 ~0.97 ~0.76
Stoichiometric flame temperature in air (K) ~2580 ~2340 ~2390
Flammability Limits in Pure O2 (%) 4.6 – 93.9 5.4 – 59.2 2.4 – 61.1
Heat of combustion (kJ g-1) 135.4 52.8 40.3
Liquid heat of combustion (MJ per liter) 9.59 22.29 23.56
Gas heat of combustion (MJ m-3 @ STP) 12.09 37.70 93.48
Peak combustion pressure ratio Air ~8.8 ~8.0 ~8.2
Lower O2 combustion limit in O2-N2 mix (%) ~3.2 ~4.0 ~4.5
Temp when gas is heavier than RT air (K) ~21 ~162 ~444
The flammability limits shown in TABLE 2 do not tell the whole story.  FIGURE 1 and
FIGURE 2 show the flammability limits for hydrogen and methane as a function fuel content
expressed as percent of the fuel in a fuel-oxidizer mixture and the oxygen content of the
oxidizer (a mixture of oxygen and nitrogen).  The flammability limits given apply at STP
(STP = 293.16 K and 0.1013 MPa).  The flammability limits change with temperature and
pressure.  At pressures below about 100 Pa, there is no burning [4].  At pressures of 1500 Pa
there may be burning, but an explosion is not a hazard [4].
TABLE 3.  Various properties of the solid, liquid and gas for helium, nitrogen, oxygen, hydrogen, methane,
and propane.  Included in the table is the maximum heat flux into the liquid gas when the cryostat vacuum is
broken or when the liquid gas spills into the cryostat vacuum vessel.
Parameter He N2 O2 H2 CH4 C3H8
Triple point temperature Tt (K) 2.177^ 63.15 54.36 13.81* 90.69 91.46
Triple point pressure Pt (kPa) 5.04 12.46 0.146 7.04 11.70 -ND-
Triple point density rt (kg m-3) 129^ 870 1306 77.0* 451.5 ~670
Heat of fusion @ Tt (J g-1) -NA- 25.3 13.7 59.5* 58.41 79.97
Boiling temp. Tb @ 1 bar (K) 4.222 77.35 90.19 20.28* 111.67 230.46
Liquid density rl @ Tb (kg m-3) 124.9 807 1141 70.8* 422.4 585.3
Gas density rg @ Tb (kg m-3) 16.89 4.622 4.467 1.339* 1.816 2.497
Gas to liquid volume ratio at Tb 7.395 175.6 255.4 52.87* 232.6 298.0
Gas V293 to Liquid Vb Ratio 699.4 645.6 798.7 792.9 591.4 379.0
Liquid Cp @ Tb (J g-1 K-1) 5.255 2.042 1.699 9.668* 3.481 -ND-
Gas Cp @ Tb (J g-1 K-1) 9.144 1.341 0.980 12.24* 2.218 1.642
Heat of vaporization @ Tb (J g-1) 20.7 198.8 213.1 445* 510.8 424.8
Heat flux for DT=300-Tb (kWm-2) ~200 ~27 ~24 ~93 ~47 -NA-
Broken vacuum heat flux (kWm-2) ~35 ~1.6 ~0.35 ~19 ~0.31 -NA-
Critical temperature Tc (K) 5.195 126.2 154.6 32.98 190.6 368.8
Critical pressure Pc (MPa) 0.228 3.39 5.04 1.29 4.59 4.36
Critical density rc (kg m-3) 69.64 313 436 31.0 162.7 -ND-
^  The triple point for helium is the Lambda point where the gas and two liquid states coexist.
*  This is for hydrogen in the para state.
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FIGURE 1.  The flammability limits for hydrogen in an O2 – N2 oxidizer gas mixture as function of the
percentage of hydrogen in the fuel-oxidizer gas mixture and the percentage of oxygen in the O2 – N2 mixture.
The flammability limits shown in FIGURE 1 and FIGURE 2 are the measured values for
an oxidizer gas that is 100 percent and 21 percent oxygen (air).  The other values for the
flammability limits are calculated based on the energy needed to sustain the burning (the
energy needed to raise the mixture to its ignition temperature).   In the literature, the term
flammability limit and explosive limit are often interchanged.  The explosion limits are
narrower than the flammability limits, because extra energy is needed for detonation to occur.
When one compares FIGS. 1 and 2 and the data in TABLE 2, it is clear that the flammability
limits for hydrogen are much broader than for methane or propane.  The upper flammability
limit is driven by stoichiometry.  The upper flammability limit for CO and H2 are the same in
air and pure O2.  From the standpoint of safety, the upper flammability limit is usually less
important than the lower flammability limit, because safety is often approached from the lower
flammability limit end.  Also important is the lower flammability limit based on oxygen
content of the oxidizer (3.2 percent for H2 and 4 percent for CH4).
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FIGURE 2.  The flammability limits for methane in an O2 – N2 oxidizer gas mixture as function of the
percentage of methane in the fuel-oxidizer gas mixture and the percentage of oxygen in the O2 – N2 mixture.
HYDROGEN SAFETY ISSUES FOR LIQUID AND GAS
TABLES 2 and 3 contain enough data to develop reasonable safety strategies for
hydrogen.  When developing hydrogen safety strategies, it is useful to compare them with the
safety strategies commonly used for methane and other flammable gasses.  Specific safety
requirements are imposed by some laboratories.  Some of these regulations are discussed, but
the laboratories shall remain nameless to protect the innocent.  
The topics in this section include the following: 1) cryogenic and chemical embrittlement,
2) the design of liquid hydrogen vessels, and gas vessels, 3) design of the cryostat vacuum
vessel (including oxygen enrichment), 4) thin window design, 5) the design of the hydrogen
fill and vent systems, 6) the hydrogen zone and sensor location, and 7) other hazards.  There
may be other potential safety issues not discussed here.  All of the safety issues that are
relevant to the hydrogen device being built must be included in the safety documentation.
Cryogenic and Chemical Embrittlement
Cryogenic embrittlement is the key element in the selection of materials for any
cryogenic device.  The materials that can be safely used in a cryogenic system include some
high nickel steels, invar and related materials, austenitic stainless steels, most aluminum alloys
and most copper alloys.  Cryostats for use at temperatures below 140 K are commonly made
from austenitic stainless steels and aluminum for both the cryogen vessel and the vacuum
vessel.  Propane tanks are commonly made from steel with a temperature rating of -50 C.
Propane and methane do not cause chemical embrittlement in the way hydrogen does.
Hydrogen embrittlement is a function of pressure and the exposure time [5].  Fortunately,
hydrogen embrittlement is not a problem with most of the materials used to fabricate
cryogenic vessels [5].  Avoid the use of carbon steel and the nickel steels commonly used in
methane vessels.  The welds in 304 stainless vessels can be subject to embrittlement.
The Design of the Cryogenic Vessel and Room Temperature Gas Vessels
All cryogen vessels and attached gas vessels for a liquid-hydrogen, a liquid-methane, or a
propane system must be designed in accordance with the applicable pressure vessel code for
flammable gasses and liquids.  The piping used to connect the cryogenic vessel to external
gas vessels must be rated for carrying a flammable gas or liquid at the lowest temperature in
the system.  The hydrogen vessel must withstand a pressure that would make an attached thin
window burst.  At the point where a thin window is designed to burst (at room temperature),
the stress in the metal in the rest of the vessel should be lower than the yield stress.  Air leaks
into a liquid-hydrogen vessel must be eliminated.  The vessel must operate at a pressure above
0.11 MPa or exposed warm gas pipes to the vessel must have an inert cover gas.
The cryogen vessel should be a welded vessel.  Elastomer seals must not be used.  Metal
seals on pipes that are attached to the cryogen vessel must be approved for use with
flammable cryogenic gasses and liquids or they must undergo a certification program that is
approved by the safety committee.  Any instrumentation used in the cryogen vessel must be
certified (either by test or by a recognized agency) as usable with flammable fluids.
The Design of the Room Temperature Cryostat Vacuum Vessels
Propane tanks do not have vacuum vessels.  Large liquid methane tanks may not have
vacuum vessels either, because foam insulation is often used.  Large methane vessels have a
liquefier that re-liquefies the methane that is boiled off.  Since there is no oxygen enrichment
in the insulation, this is reasonable.  Liquid hydrogen tanks nearly always have an insulating
vacuum with MLI.  Large NASA hydrogen vessels are an exception.   An example is the
space shuttle external hydrogen tank, which is foam insulated without a vacuum vessel.  It is
better to boil off extra hydrogen on the ground than to carry a vacuum vessel into space.
It can be argued that a hydrogen-cryostat vacuum vessel must be designed to the same
standards as the cryogen vessel.  The root of this argument is that in the event of a hydrogen
leak into the vacuum vessel, the vacuum vessel becomes a flammable gas (or liquid) vessel.
There are laboratories that use less stringent standards for the design of a cryostat vacuum
vessel.  This is not consistent, particularly if the vacuum vessel has thin windows in it.  
There is at least one laboratory that requires that the vacuum vessel for a hydrogen tank
be 52 times larger than the hydrogen tank.  The theory for this requirement is that the vacuum
vessel can take all of the gas that is evaporated at 20 K without a pressure rise.  One should
ask the question, “Would one design a liquid helium vessel (helium has a very low heat of
vaporization) or a liquid-nitrogen vessel (nitrogen expands over 150 times from liquid to gas
at 77 K) this way?”  The answer is no.  The premise behind this rule doesn’t make sense,
because one can design the vacuum vessel relief system to carry the hydrogen gas that will be
produced by film boiling on the room temperature vessel walls.  (See TABLE 3 [6] to [8].)
The vacuum vessel must have relief devices that vent it into the hydrogen venting system.
Because the boiling temperature of liquid hydrogen is below the triple point temperature
of all gasses (except He and Ne), air gasses that leak into the vacuum vessel will freeze on the
outer surface of the hydrogen container.  (This can be a hazard even for a liquid helium tank.)
A second worry is oxygen from the air combining with hydrogen in the vacuum vessel.  For
this to be a safety hazard, the following must occur: 1) air leaks into the cryostat vacuum
vessel; 2) hydrogen leaks into the vacuum vessel; 3) the hydrogen vessel warms up to release
oxygen; and 4) there is a source of ignition to ignite the mixture of hydrogen and air.
The reason that an air leak into a hydrogen cryostat vacuum vessel is considered to be a
potential safety problem is that an air leak is undetectable.  Even air leaks at the 10– 3 Pa m3 s– 1
level are cryo-pumped to the surface of the hydrogen vessel without a rise in pressure.  On the
other hand, a hydrogen leak is very detectable, because the vacuum in the cryostat rises.  A
cryostat vacuum of 0.1 Pa (10– 3 torr) is enough to be measured and it is enough to spoil the
performance of the MLI.  At least one laboratory recommends that the vacuum vessel of a
liquid hydrogen cryostat be blanketed with another vacuum or an inert gas.  One does not
have to go that far, provided the following steps are taken: 1) the vacuum vessel is welded
closed by qualified welders (with no elastomer seals); 2) the hydrogen vessel is welded closed
by qualified welders; and 3) there is no ignition source in the cryostat vacuum space.
Thin Window Design
Thin windows are commonly used in physics experiments.  The laboratories that conduct
such experiments often have their own standards that are applied to thin windows.  In most
physics experiments, the thin windows must be made from low-Z material that has a low
density.  In addition the windows must be strong at room temperature and even stronger at
cryogenic temperatures.  The windows must not be subject to cryogenic or chemical
embrittlement.  Under theses standards, the use of beryllium or Mylar windows is precluded
on most liquid hydrogen vessels.  Beryllium windows may be used on a methane vessel.
Several laboratories have the following requirements for flammable-liquid thin windows;
1) The system must have a minimum working pressure of 0.17 MPa. 2) The minimum design
burst pressure must be four times the system working pressure.  A representative number of
the thin windows (say 4 to 6 windows) must be burst at room temperature and all of the
windows must burst at pressures above the minimum design burst pressure.  At least one
window must be burst at 77 K to verify that the 77-K burst pressure is higher than the room
temperature burst pressure.  3) The windows must not buckle at room temperature at an
external pressure of 0.17 MPa.  4) The thin window and its seal must be vacuum leak tight.
The usual standard of leak tightness is better than 10– 9 Pa m3 s– 1 for helium at room
temperature at a pressure of 0.1 MPa measured with a mass spectrometer leak detector.  The
design requirements given above are reasonable.  Thin windows for a liquid hydrogen
cryostat vacuum vessel should be designed to the same standards as the windows for a liquid-
hydrogen vessel, because when a window on the liquid-hydrogen vessel bursts or leaks, the
vacuum vessel window become the primary safety window.
The Design of the Hydrogen Fill and Hydrogen Vent Systems
A survey by one laboratory revealed that most safety incidents with liquid hydrogen
systems occur when the liquid hydrogen device is being filled or is being emptied.   Most
small liquid hydrogen devices are completely closed cycle with all of the hydrogen put in as a
gas at room temperature.  A refrigerator liquefies the hydrogen in the system.  As the
hydrogen is liquefied, the gas pressure goes down in the external storage tank.  The concept
of a closed cycle system is illustrated in FIGURE 3.
FIGURE 3.  A schematic of a closed-cycle  liquid-hydrogen system.  The gas is stored in the buffer volume.
The size of the gas volume VG is a function of the liquid hydrogen volume VL, the
maximum allowable working pressure anywhere in the system PM, the pressure when the
liquid volume is filled PL (PL = 0.1013 MPa), and X(PL) the volume ratio of gas at 293 K and
the liquid.  (From TABLE 3, X = 793 when PL = 0.1013 MPa).  The gas volume for a closed-
cycle hydrogen system can be estimated using the following expression;
† 
VG =
X(PL ) - (PM PL )
(PM PL ) -1
VL (2)
From the equation above one can see that if PM/PL is small the gas volume is large relative to
the liquid volume.   If the hydrogen system can be designed so that PM can be above the
critical pressure, the gas volume relative to the liquid volume will be more manageable.  
The passive system shown in FIG. 3 is safe.  When there is a fault that results in a rapid
boil-off, the gas volume takes up the hydrogen gas without venting, provided the pipes are
sized correctly.  Large systems (>10 liters) are often not made passive, because it would cost
too much.  An open system is one that is filled with gas from bottles or liquid from a tank.
Systems where fuel is being supplied to a vehicle (the space shuttle) are by definition open
systems.  An intermediate system might use a hydride bed as a virtual gas volume.  Gas can
be supplied and be taken up by a hydride bed at its design rate, but no faster.  Gas that must
be vented faster than the hydride bed design rate must be vented to the outside world.
In any system, the vent must be designed correctly.  Some of the things that one can do
to design a safe vent system include the following; 1) the vent system should be flooded with
an inert gas (helium, nitrogen or argon), 2) the vent must be designed to have a low pressure
drop at the peak gas flow; 3) the vent system can be made explosion proof by using pipes
thick enough to contain a pressure of 5 MPa (The weakness may lie in the rest of the
system.); and 4) the end of the vent pipe must be above the roof of the hydrogen system
building.   Some safety regulations may require that the hydrogen be burned off at the vent.  
The Hydrogen Zone and Sensor Location
The hydrogen zone is defined as the zone where ignition sources are completely barred.
The ignition sources include but are not restricted to; 1) flames or heating elements that go
above the ignition temperature of the gas, 2) electrical sparking [9], 3) sources of static
electricity than can cause sparking [10], and 4) improper tools.  (About 0.02 mJ will ignite H2,
CH4, and C3H8.)  The definition of a hydrogen zone varies widely.  European standards allow
for a hydrogen zone to be restricted to the region under a hood over the hydrogen area. In the
US, the hydrogen zone may include a whole building.  This means that the building electrical
system must be explosion proof and other sources of ignition must be eliminated.  
Hydrogen sensors must be located above the hydrogen system because hydrogen will
always rise.   Sensors for propane must be below the device, because propane is always
heavier than air.  Methane can be lighter or heavier than air depending on its temperature.
Other Safety Issues
Other safety issues include asphyxiation and freezing.  Asphyxiation is not an issue as
long as one is below the lower flammability limit.  Asphyxiation may be an issue in locations
where an inert cover gas is used to ensure that the oxygen content of the gas around the
apparatus is lower than the lower limit for oxygen (about 3 percent).  A well-designed
hydrogen or methane system does not have any exposed pipes that are at cryogenic
temperatures.  The vent pipes may be cold enough to cause freezing after an emergency
venting of the system.  Propane systems often have bare pipes that can get quite cold from
propane expansion.  There are other potential safety hazards that are not covered here.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This report is not complete in its coverage of hydrogen safety.  It is hoped that some of
the information given here is useful for designing hydrogen devices that are safe.  The author
has purposefully omitted direct reference to the various codes that apply to hydrogen safety or
the safety of methane and propane.  The codes change frequently and they vary by country.
The author encourages those who design a liquid-hydrogen system to translate the applicable
codes into direct engineering criteria that apply to the device being built.  Safety systems
should not be connected to a computer.  The safety system should stand by itself.
A hydrogen safety review committee should be reviewing the engineering design, not
bureaucratic paperwork.  Paperwork does not make a device safe; only quality engineering
can do that.  A safety review should never be rushed.  Time should be taken to make sure that
those who do the safety review fully understand the device being reviewed.
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